This study develops a political competition model in which campaign platforms are partially binding. A candidate who implements a policy that di¤ers from his/her platform must pay a cost of betrayal, which increases with the size of the discrepancy.
Introduction
Most past studies on the two-candidate model of political competition show a politician's convergence with the ideal policy of the median voter. However, observed patterns in realworld elections are frequently polarized. One simple reason for this is polarized politicians.
That is, politicians'policy preferences are extreme, which means these policies are further from the median voter's ideal policy. Some candidates renege on their campaign promises to the electorate and implement an extreme policy after an election. However, most past studies show that more moderate candidates beat more extreme candidates when these two candidates run. If so, winning politicians should not be so polarized. To understand polarization, it is important to answer the following questions. How do candidates with extreme policy preferences beat those whose policy preferences are less extreme? Why do extreme candidates have an incentive to win by compromising their preferences and approaching the median policy in an electoral campaign, but ultimately implementing a polarized, extreme policy after winning?
The striking result of this study is that an extreme candidate has a higher probability of winning than does a moderate candidate, although the extreme candidate will implement a more extreme policy. The important reason for the extreme candidate's higher probability of winning is that he has a stronger incentive to prevent an opponent from winning because his ideal policy is further from the opponent's policy than is that of a moderate candidate.
My model describes this incentive for an extreme candidate by introducing two reasonable assumptions: partially binding platforms and uncertainty about a candidate's preference.
My model with partially binding platforms assumes that a candidate can choose any policy after the election. However, a politician who implements a policy that di¤ers from his/her campaign platform must pay a "cost of betrayal," which increases with the degree of betrayal. I also introduce asymmetric information by assuming that candidate policy preferences are private information. A politician's preferences may change depending on local conditions or the important issues in a given election. In particular, when candidates are not well known, it is di¢ cult to know their preferences. Even in a political competition among parties, a party's preferences may change depending on the leader of the party.
Voters are also uncertain of how power will be distributed between factions as a result of an intra-party negotiation after an election. In particular, if several parties form a coalition government, voters will be especially uncertain about implemented policies, since these will depend on the negotiation among the members of the coalition.
The model supposes a two-candidate political competition in a one-dimensional policy space. One candidate's ideal policy is to the left of the median policy, while that of the other candidate is to the right. Candidates are entirely motivated by policy. Each candidate is one of two types -moderate or extreme-and the moderate type's ideal policy is closer to the median policy than that of the extreme type. A candidate knows his/her own type, but voters and the opponent do not. In the remainder of the paper, I refer to an extreme type as "he"and a moderate type as "she."
If voters believe in advance that a candidate is likely to be extreme, an extreme type has a higher probability of winning than a moderate type in a semi-separating equilibrium. In this equilibrium, an extreme type chooses a mixed strategy. With some probability, the extreme type announces the same platform as the moderate type, and with the remaining probability, approaches the median policy, thus revealing his type to voters. We call an extreme type a "pooling extreme type" when he imitates the moderate type, but a "separating extreme type"when he approaches the median policy.
A separating extreme type implements a more moderate policy than a pooling extreme type, but this is still a more extreme policy than that of a moderate type in equilibrium. This is because an extreme type will betray his platform to a greater extent than a moderate type, even though the platform of a separating extreme type is more moderate than that of a moderate type. While voters know the type of a separating extreme type, they remain uncertain about the type of candidate who announces a moderate type's platform, because this may be a moderate or a pooling extreme type candidate. Voters around the median policy wish to avoid electing a pooling extreme type who will implement the most extreme policy. Thus, they forgo the chance to elect a moderate type who will implement the most moderate policy and choose a separating extreme type whose implemented policy lies between those of a moderate and a pooling extreme type. This is also the reason why a separating extreme type can implement a more extreme policy than a moderate type, but still defeat her. As a result, a separating extreme type has a higher probability of winning than a moderate type (and a pooling extreme type) in equilibrium.
On the other hand, if voters believe that a candidate is likely to be a moderate type, a separating extreme type needs to rigorously approach the median policy to win. In this case, an extreme type just imitates a moderate type with certainty (a pooling equilibrium). As a result, a moderate type can never have a higher probability of winning than an extreme type.
In several countries, an extreme party won an election by announcing a moderate platform, such as the Justice and Development Party of Turkey in 2007 and the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan in the early 2000s. According to my model, an extreme candidate or party approaches the median policy and wins because he wants to prevent the opposition from winning. This is an important reason why extremists compromised and won in some countries. I discuss these examples in detail in Appendix B.
Related Literature
While my study assumes partially binding platforms, most previous studies use one of two polar assumptions about platforms. First, models with completely binding platforms assume that a politician cannot implement any policy other than that of the platform.
1 Second, models with nonbinding platforms assume that a politician can implement any policy freely, without cost. 2 In other words, a politician implements his/her ideal policy regardless of platform. However, in reality, politicians often betray their platforms, but doing so is likely to be costly. When politicians implement a policy that di¤ers from their platform, their approval rating may fall as a result of criticism from voters and the media. 3 They will need to undertake costly negotiations with Congress, the party may punish them, 4 and the possibility of losing the next election may increase. Therefore, platforms should be partially binding. That is, a politician should decide on a policy based on the platform and the cost of betrayal.
Some previous studies have considered a similar idea to the cost of betrayal. In particular, Banks (1990) and Callander and Wilkie (2007) show that a platform can signal a policy to be implemented. My study di¤ers from these in two important ways. First, in their studies, candidates automatically implement their own ideal policy after an election. However, if
there is a cost of betrayal, a rational candidate would adjust the implemented policy to reduce this cost after an election. Second, Banks (1990) and Callander and Wilkie (2007) consider that candidates care about policy only when they win; their utility is set to zero when they lose, regardless of the policy their opponent implements. However, policy-motivated candidates should care about policy when they lose. With these two assumptions, Banks (1990) and Callander and Wilkie (2007) show that a moderate type may defeat an extreme type when there is asymmetric information about each of the candidate's ideal policies. I relax these assumptions and add more reasonable ones by examining the rational choices when implementing a policy, as well as candidates who care about policy regardless of the election results. Thus, my results are the opposite of those in the aforementioned studies.
That is, an extreme type has a higher probability of winning than a moderate type.
5
These two di¤erences are critical to my results. First, if candidates implement their own ideal policies automatically, an extreme candidate will lose against a moderate type when he reveals his type to voters. Thus, a separating extreme type cannot obtain a higher probability of winning in a semi-separating equilibrium. Second, if a candidate does not care about policy when he/she loses, an extreme type will not have as strong an incentive to prevent an opponent from winning. Therefore, under the assumptions of Banks (1990) and Callander and Wilkie (2007) , an extreme type does not have either a method or an incentive to win against a moderate type. I will clarify these points in Section 3.5.1. 6 The other important setting to obtain my result is asymmetric information. If voters know the candidate's type, an extreme type cannot pretend to be a moderate type, so both pooling and 5 There is another di¤erence between my study and those of Banks (1990) and Callander and Wilkie (2007) . The latter studies assume a continuum of candidate types, while I assume just two types of candidate, namely a moderate and an extreme type. If my model used a continuum of types, a semi-separating equilibrium would not exist, but a pooling equilibrium would exist in some circumstances. To have a semi-separating equilibrium, an extreme type's platform should have su¢ cient distance from that of a moderate (and a pooling extreme) candidate. A continuum makes it di¢ cult to have such a su¢ cient distance. However, candidates'types do not need to be on a continuum in a real-world election. Usually, there are a few factions or groups on each side. Voters may be uncertain about the candidates'group or faction, or which group has power in a party or in Congress. Such a situation should be analyzed using distinct types rather than on a continuum. 6 In Callander (2008) , candidates care about what happens when they lose. Here, there are two choicespolicy and a level of e¤ort-and candidates can fully commit to a policy before an election (completely binding), or decide on a level of e¤ort after winning (nonbinding). Then, Callander (2008) shows that a policy position can signal a future level of e¤ort. Hummel (2010) supposes that there exist costs when policy announcements are di¤erent between primary and general elections. Other studies also consider that a completely binding platform is a signal for the functioning of the economy (Schulz, 1996) and the candidate's degree of honesty (Kartik and McAfee, 2007). semi-separating equilibria do not exist. Indeed, Asako (forthcoming) shows that a moderate type wins against an extreme type when assuming the same settings as this study apart from asymmetric information.
The idea that an implemented policy will lie somewhere between a platform and an ideal policy is not entirely original. Several other studies discuss ideas concerning partially binding platforms with complete information. Austen-Smith and Banks (1989) consider a two-period game based on a retrospective voting model in which, if o¢ ce-motivated candidates betray their platforms, the probability of winning in the next election decreases. Helpman (2005, 2008 ) develop a legislative model in which o¢ ce-motivated parties announce platforms before an election, and the victorious legislators, who are policy-motivated, decide the policy. If legislators betray the party platform, the party punishes them. In contrast, my model is based on a prospective and two-candidate competition model, and I consider that candidates who are policy-motivated decide both the platform and policy. 7 In Huang (2010), candidates strategically choose both a platform and an implemented policy, but do not care about policy when they lose. Huang (2010) also supposes su¢ ciently large bene…ts from holding o¢ ce and shows that candidates cluster around or at the median policy. On the other hand, my model supposes that candidates care about policy even after losing, and does not consider (large) bene…ts from holding o¢ ce.
Several past studies consider the e¤ects of a candidate's character or personality, as indicated by Stokes (1963) , as "valence." These past studies assume that the valence of a candidate is given exogenously, and voters care not only about the policy, but also about valence. They show that a candidate with good valence has a higher probability of winning an election. 8 Therefore, an extreme candidate may win against a moderate candidate if he has good valence, as shown by Kartik and McAfee (2007) and Callander (2008) . 9 On the 7 Austen-Smith and Banks (1989) consider only a decrease in the probability of winning as the cost of betrayal, and Helpman (2005, 2008) consider only party discipline as the cost of betrayal. However, as I have indicated, the cost of betrayal also includes other types of costs, such as a decrease in approval ratings or a negotiation cost with Congress. Therefore, I include these in the current term as the cost of betrayal. In addition, Harrington (1993) , Aragones et al. (2007) , and Ishihara (2014) show that, in a repeated game, nonbinding platforms can be completely binding in equilibrium.
8 For example, in Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) , Aragones and Palfrey (2002) , Groseclose (2001) , Kartik and McAfee (2007) , and Callander (2008) , there are advantaged and disadvantaged candidates. An advantage is given exogenously as a valence, and a voter's utility is a¤ected by both a policy and this valence.
9 Kartik and McAfee (2007) give good "character" exogenously, and interpret it as integrity. Callander (2008) gives this valence endogenously using policy motivation, but a candidate's policy motivation is given exogenously. In both studies, more extreme policy can be a signal for good valence.
other hand, my study shows that an extreme candidate wins against a moderate candidate without such exogenous valence.
10
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model, and Section 3 analyzes the equilibria. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper.
Setting
The policy space is <. There is a continuum of voters, and their ideal policies are distributed on some interval of <. The distribution function is continuous and strictly increasing, so there is a unique median voter's ideal policy, x m . There are two candidates, L and R, and each candidate is one of two types: moderate or extreme. Let x M i and x E i denote the respective ideal policies for the moderate and extreme types, where i = L or R, and
The superscripts M and E represent a moderate or extreme type, respectively, and the moderate type's ideal policy is closer to the median policy. Assume
That is, the ideal policies of the same type are equidistant from the median policy. A candidate knows his/her own type, but voters and the opponent are uncertain about the candidate's type. For both candidates, p M 2 (0; 1) is the prior probability that the candidate is a moderate type. Thus, the prior probability that the candidate is an extreme type is 1 p M .
After the types of candidates are decided, each candidate announces a platform, denoted by z t i 2 <, where i = L or R and t = M or E. On the basis of these platforms, voters decide on a winner according to a majority voting rule. After an election, the winning candidate chooses an implemented policy, denoted by t i , where i = L or R and t = M or E. The relations among an ideal policy, a platform, and an implemented policy are summarized in [ Figure 1 here] 10 The other important topic related to campaign platforms is political ambiguity. Here, a candidate announces an ambiguous platform that includes more than one policy choice (Zeckhauser, 1969; Shepsle, 1972; Aragones and Cukierman, 1990; Glazer, 1990; Aragones and Neeman, 2000; Aragones and Postlewaite, 2002; Meirowitz, 2005; Callander and Wilson, 2008) . However, it is di¢ cult to obtain an equilibrium with an ambiguous platform. As a result, they use a very simple setting, such as a restricted number of policy choices, degrees of ambiguity, and/or a special form of voters'preferences. Thus, it is important to derive an equilibrium using an ambiguous platform with more standard settings. However, this topic is outside the scope of this study's purpose, so I do not analyze political ambiguity here.
If the implemented policy is di¤erent from the candidate's ideal policy, all candidatesboth winner and loser-experience disutility. This disutility is represented by v(j x t i j), where i = L or R, t = M or E, and is the policy implemented by the winner. Assume that
policy is not the same as the platform, the winning candidate needs to pay a cost of betrayal.
The function describing the cost of betrayal is c(jz i j). Assume that c(:) satis…es c(0) = 0,
Here, the loser does not pay a cost.
Moreover, I assume throughout that c 
Upon observing a platform, the utility of voter n when candidate i of type t wins is
voters'revised beliefs that candidate i is of type t upon observing platform z. The expected utility of voter n when the winner is candidate i, who promises z i , is 
where i; j = L; R and t = M; E. In what follows, I concentrate on a symmetric, pure-strategy, perfect Bayesian equilibrium consisting of strategies and beliefs.
Equilibrium

Policy Implemented by the Winner
Following an election, the winning candidate implements a policy that maximizes his/her utility following a win, v(j
Lemma 1 The implemented policy
candidate's utility. A bene…t from holding o¢ ce would not change my results signi…cantly when the bene…t is small. Here, candidates approach the median policy more closely, but the main characteristics of the equilibria do not change. Therefore, I simply assume that the bene…t from holding o¢ ce is zero. However, if the bene…ts from holding o¢ ce are great, candidates'implemented policies converge to the median policy regardless of type. This is what Huang (2010) shows by introducing su¢ ciently high bene…ts from holding o¢ ce, which compensate for all disutility resulting from the policy and the cost of betrayal.
13 I do not consider candidates' decisions to run, and the number of candidates (two) is given here. If an endogenous decision to run is introduced based on a citizen-candidate model (Besley and Coate, 1997; Osborne and Slivinski, 1996) , there is a possibility that more than two candidates decide to run. When three or more candidates run, it is well known that there are many equilibria in a political competition, assuming completely binding platforms (e.g., see Adams, Merrill III, and Grofman, 2005) . Such problems arise even when analyzing partially binding platforms. If it is simply supposed that there are only two potential candidates (with two possible types), both candidates have an incentive to run regardless of their type if the cost to run is su¢ ciently low, even if one candidate has a lower probability of winning. Indeed, Asako (forthcoming) shows that a candidate whose probability of winning is zero runs in order to change the opponent's (i.e., the winner's) policy with a partially binding platform and complete information. A similar implication can be obtained here. Thus, such endogenous decisions to run are not analyzed here, and I implicitly assume that the cost to run is su¢ ciently low to induce two candidates to run, but su¢ ciently high that it deters other citizens whose ideal policy is around the median policy from entering the race.
When the platform di¤ers from the ideal policy, the implemented policy must di¤er from the platform or the ideal policy since it is decided by the winner (who no longer cares about the loser's platform, but cares about the cost of betrayal) after an election. The implemented policy will lie between the platform and the candidate's ideal policy, as shown in Figure 1 . If voters know the candidate's type (ideal policy), they can also know the future implemented policy by observing the platform. However, with asymmetric information, they may not know the candidate's type. Here, the median voter x m is pivotal. Thus, if the candidate is
Following an election, an extreme type will betray the platform more severely and pay a higher cost of betrayal. However, at the same time, the ideal policy for an extreme type this platform. As shown in Figure 2 , since an extreme type will betray his platform to a greater extent than will a moderate type, the extreme type's implemented policy,
, is more extreme than that of the moderate type,
Second, a more moderate platform may not mean that this platform is closer to the median policy, because there is a possibility that a platform encroaches on the opponent's side of the policy space (i.e., z Figure 2 , if both types' platforms encroach on the opponent's side, z
is further from the median policy than that of a moderate type, which means that his ideal policy is also further from the opponent's implemented policy. Thus, an extreme type has a higher disutility from the opponent's victory. Therefore, he …nds it especially costly if the opponent wins, more so than a moderate type does. As a result, an extreme type has higher marginal bene…t and cost than a moderate type. Since an extreme type has a higher marginal cost of betrayal, he does not have an incentive to choose a more moderate implemented policy than a moderate type (Lemma 2-(ii)). However, an extreme type has a higher marginal bene…t, so he has an incentive to announce a more moderate platform than a moderate type (Lemma 2-(i)).
Therefore, when both candidates announce a pooling strategy, z M i , an extreme type prefers his winning to the opponent winning. Thus, an extreme type does not have an incentive to lose. However, there is a possibility that an extreme type has an incentive to further approach the median policy and win with certainty, since he prefers his winning to the opponent winning at z M i . To check this incentive of an extreme type, the o¤-path belief of voters must be speci…ed.
Beliefs
Suppose that when a candidate deviates from z M i , voters believe with a probability of one that the candidate is an extreme type. That is, I consider the simple o¤-path beliefs p i (M jz i ) = 0. This simple o¤-path belief is partially based on the idea of the intuitive criterion in Cho and Kreps (1987) . In a pooling equilibrium, a moderate type is indi¤erent to her winning and the opponent winning at z M i . Thus, a moderate type never chooses a more moderate platform than z M i since her expected payo¤ decreases from the equilibrium expected-payo¤ even if voters believe this candidate to be a moderate type as a result of this deviation. 16 As a result, if a platform is announced that is more moderate than z platform that lies between z
M i
and z
The intuitive criterion cannot apply to any other o¤-path beliefs, so I simply assume that p i (M jz i ) = 0 for all o¤-path strategies.
The Existence of the Pooling Equilibrium
Voters do not know candidates'types in a pooling equilibrium, so their expected utility is the weighted average of the utility between a moderate and an extreme type. On the other hand, if an extreme type deviates by approaching the median policy, voters believe that this candidate's type is extreme because of the o¤-path belief. If an extreme type deviates to announce a su¢ ciently moderate platform, this extreme type can win over an uncertain opponent who chooses z 
The left-hand side is the utility of the median voter when extreme candidate i, who deviates to z 0 i wins. The right-hand side is the expected utility of the median voter when candidate j, who announces the pooling platform z [ Figure 3 here] An extreme type does not deviate by announcing a platform that is more moderate than
The right-hand side is the extreme candidate i's expected utility when he stays in a pooling equilibrium. His expected utility from this deviation is slightly lower than the left-hand side.
If (5) exists. Now, denote
Then, condition (5) to announce a very moderate platform to win with certainty, because the expected utility to the median voter of choosing L is quite high given that there is a strong possibility that L is moderate and will implement a moderate policy. Thus, as in Figure 3 (b), there is a signi…cant distance between z 0 R and R's ideal policy, so this deviation decreases his expected utility. As a result, a pooling equilibrium exists. However, if p M is su¢ ciently low, the expected utility of the median voter who chooses L is quite low. Thus, if R slightly approaches the median policy, the policy he implements improves for the median voter. That is, z 0 R is closer to z M R , as in Figure 3 (c), so the extreme type will deviate from a pooling strategy. ) (mainly decided by a moderate type's utility and cost functions), and
) (mainly decided by an extreme type's utility and cost functions). For example, if a moderate type's ideal policy becomes more moderate, she will announce a more extreme platform z M i
, and implement a more moderate policy
) in a pooling equilibrium, as per Lemma 2. Thus, z 0 i may become more moderate since a moderate type will implement a more moderate policy. However, since z M i becomes more extreme,
Note that this pooling equilibrium exists in the broader value of the o¤-path beliefs. For example, suppose p i (M jz i ) = p M if the platform is more extreme than z M i . Then a candidate still has no incentive to deviate to a more extreme platform than z M i , since he/she will then be certain to lose and the expected utility decreases or is unchanged by this deviation. A pooling equilibrium can exist when the o¤-path belief,
which is more extreme than z M i .
Semi-separating Equilibrium
If p M < p, a pooling equilibrium does not exist since an extreme type will deviate from
to z 0 i . In this case, a moderate type still announces one platform with certainty (a pure strategy). On the other hand, an extreme type chooses a mixed strategy: With some probability, an extreme type announces the same platform as a moderate type (a pooling extreme type). With the remaining probability, an extreme type approaches the median policy (a separating extreme type). That is, if p M < p, a semi-separating equilibrium exists.
De…nition and Proposition
In a semi-separating equilibrium, a moderate type announces z i , and an extreme type announces z i with probability M 2 (0; 1), and z i with the remaining probability, 1 M . I call this type of a semi-separating equilibrium a two-policy semi-separating equilibrium. This equilibrium is shown in Figure 4 (a) and is de…ned as follows.
De…nition 2 In a two-policy semi-separating equilibrium, a moderate type chooses z i , and an extreme type chooses z i with probability M 2 (0; 1), and z i with probability 1 M .
[ Figure 4 here] Now, denote z i (and z j ) such that it satis…es
be more extreme, which may induce z 0 i to be more extreme. Moreover, if voters are su¢ ciently risk averse, when the distance between where z i and z j are symmetric (jx m z i j = jx m z j j). The left-hand side is the expected utility of moderate candidate i when the opponent promising z j wins. The right-hand side is the utility of moderate candidate i when she wins. That is, a moderate type is indi¤erent between her winning and the opponent who wins and announces z j .
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Next, denote z i such that it satis…es
That is, the median voter prefers z i to z j when z i is announced by an extreme type. The righthand side is the expected utility of the median voter when candidate j wins and announces z j . The left-hand side is the expected utility of the median voter when extreme candidate i wins and announces z i . Moreover, z i denotes the most extreme platform that satis…es (8).
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Then, the following proposition is derived.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the o¤-path beliefs of voters are
semi-separating equilibrium exists in which a moderate type chooses z i .
Proof See Appendix A.4.
Each Player' s Choice
The details of the semi-separating equilibrium are given in Appendix A.4, so I provide the intuitive reasoning in this section. Suppose again that when a candidate deviates from the equilibrium platform, voters believe with a probability of one that the candidate is an extreme type. That is, p i (M jz i ) = 0. This o¤-path belief is also partially based on the idea of the intuitive criterion. Since a moderate type is indi¤erent between her winning and the opponent winning (and announcing z j ), a moderate type never chooses a platform that is more moderate than z i . On the other hand, from Lemma 2, an extreme type prefers his winning to the winning of an opponent who announces z j when he announces z i . 20 Thus, an extreme type has an incentive to choose a more moderate platform (until his cut-o¤ platform, given z j ). The intuitive criterion cannot apply to any other o¤-path beliefs, so I simply assume that p i (M jz i ) = 0 for all o¤-path strategies.
The following summarizes each player's rational choice.
Voters: From the de…nition of z i (Inequality (8)), an extreme type who announces z i can win against an opponent who announces z j (and tie with an opponent who announces z j ).
Suppose that candidate R (an extreme type) announces z R , while candidate L announces z L . Voters can know that the type of R is extreme, but remain uncertain about the type of L who announces z L , because an extreme type L will still pretend to be moderate and announce z L with probability M . Therefore, to defeat L (i.e., to satisfy (8)), R does not need to implement a more moderate policy than a moderate type L.
In other words, for the median voter, a moderate type L will implement the best policy ( M L (z L )). However, if L wins, there is the possibility that L is an extreme type who implements the worst policy for the median voter ( E L (z L )). Thus, the median voter forgoes the chance of electing a moderate type L to avoid electing an extreme type L, and chooses the second best candidate, R, who is a separating extreme type.
A Moderate Type: As a result of this o¤-path belief, a moderate type does not have an incentive to deviate from z i . If a moderate type deviates to a more extreme platform than z i or z i 2 ( z i ; z i ), she will be certain to lose and her expected utility will remain unchanged as she is indi¤erent between her winning and the opponent winning at z i . A moderate type does not have an incentive to approach the median policy by more than z i since her utility from a winning will then become lower than her utility when the opponent wins from Lemma 2.
An Extreme Type: An extreme type prefers his winning to the opponent winning and announcing z j when he announces z i . Thus, he does not have an incentive to deviate to a more extreme platform than z i or z i 2 ( z i ; z i ) since he will be certain to lose and his expected utility will decrease. When an extreme type announces z i , his disutility following a
. This result can then be derived in the same way as Lemma 2.
win and the cost of betrayal are higher, but the probability of winning is greater than when he announces z i . Thus, an extreme type can be indi¤erent between z i and z i when p M < p.
The Existence of the Semi-separating Equilibrium
A two-policy semi-separating equilibrium exists if p M < p and
When (9) holds, an extreme type has no incentive to defeat with certainty an extreme opponent who announces z j by approaching the median policy. This is because (9) means that, for extreme candidate i, the utility when extreme opponent j who announces z j wins is higher than the utility when i wins. However, an extreme type with z i does not want to deviate to a more extreme platform because that would mean he would also lose to an opponent with z j and his expected utility would decrease.
If (9) does not hold, an extreme type still has an incentive to converge by more than z i to beat an extreme opponent who announces z j . Therefore, a two-policy semi-separating equilibrium does not exist, but a continuous semi-separating equilibrium does exist. In a continuous semi-separating equilibrium, an extreme type's mixed strategy includes z i and a Platform z i is de…ned in the same way as z i in a two-policy semi-separating equilibrium, so the basic results are the same as those of a two-policy semi-separating equilibrium. That is, a separating extreme type defeats an uncertain type (a moderate type and a pooling extreme type).
A semi-separating equilibrium exists in the broader value of the o¤-path beliefs. For
if the platform is more extreme than z i . Then a candidate still has no incentive to deviate to a more extreme platform than z i , since he/she will be certain to lose and the expected utility decreases or is unchanged by this deviation. Thus, a semi-separating equilibrium can exist when the o¤-path belief
for z i , which is more extreme than z i .
Other Possible Equilibria
The previous sections only discuss a pooling equilibrium in which both types choose z M i and a semi-separating equilibrium in which a moderate type chooses z i . This section discusses other equilibria that may exist.
Separating Equilibrium in which a Moderate Type Wins
If a separating equilibrium exists in which a moderate type wins against an extreme type, both types must choose di¤erent platforms, and the moderate type must implement a more moderate policy than does the extreme type. However, such a separating equilibrium does not exist.
Proposition 3 There is no separating equilibrium in which a moderate type wins against an extreme type, regardless of o¤-path beliefs.
Proof See Appendix A.5.
This result is true because an extreme type always has an incentive to pretend to be moderate.
If a separating equilibrium exists in which a moderate type wins, the moderate type must prefer her winning to the opponent winning in this equilibrium. However, this means an extreme type also prefers to win over having the opponent win at the moderate type's platform, for the same reasoning given in Lemma 2. Moreover, if an extreme type deviates by pretending to be a moderate type, he will have a higher probability of winning. Thus, an extreme type has an incentive to deviate by choosing the moderate type's platform within this separating strategy.
This result contradicts that of Banks (1990) and Callander and Wilkie (2007) who show that there exists a separating equilibrium in which a moderate type wins.
Separating Equilibrium in which an Extreme Type Wins
A separating equilibrium in which an extreme type wins against a moderate type exists if o¤-path beliefs are p i (M jz i ) = 0. For example, suppose that an extreme type announces a platform,ẑ E i , such that he is indi¤erent between his winning and an extreme-type opponent winning. To be precise,ẑ
where jx m ẑ t i j = jx m ẑ t j j. Suppose also that a moderate type announces z M 0 i , such that the moderate type will implement a more extreme policy than the extreme type. That
As a result of the above o¤-path beliefs, although a moderate type approaches the median policy, voters believe that this candidate is an extreme type. To increase the probability of winning, a moderate type needs to approach the median policy in a signi…cant way. This may decrease her expected utility. An extreme type does not deviate either, because he is indi¤erent between winning and losing. As a result, a separating equilibrium in which an extreme type wins exists.
However, this separating equilibrium is less important, since it exists in a very restricted set of o¤-path beliefs. For example, suppose that the o¤-path beliefs are 
Other Pooling and Semi-separating Equilibria
In the previous sections, I assume o¤-path beliefs as p i (M jz i ) = 0. Under this assumption, there exist multiple pooling and semi-separating equilibria. First, there could be a pooling equilibrium in which both types announce a platform, say z
M i
, that is more extreme than
). Since the o¤-path belief is p i (M jz i ) = 0, a moderate type needs to approach the median policy signi…cantly to be sure of winning because voters believe that the candidate is extreme when a he/she deviates from z M i , regardless of the real type. Thus, a moderate type may not want to deviate. If an extreme type also has no incentive to deviate, a pooling equilibrium with z M i exists. Second, there could be a semiseparating equilibrium in which a moderate type (and a pooling extreme type) announces a platform, say z i , that is more extreme than z i . A moderate type needs to approach the median policy signi…cantly to win against an opponent who announces z j , because this deviation leads voters to believe that the candidate is extreme. Therefore, a moderate type may have no incentive to deviate from z i .
These equilibria (including a separating equilibrium in which an extreme type wins) have several problems. First, a moderate type does not want to approach the median policy because voters will likely misunderstand the candidate to be an extreme type. Second, if the o¤-path beliefs, p i (M jz i ), exceed zero for some o¤-path platforms, many of the above equilibria will be eliminated. 21 Thus, these equilibria exist for restricted values of o¤-path beliefs.
On the other hand, the equilibria analyzed in the previous sections exist in broader values of o¤-path beliefs than do other equilibria. As I discussed, a pooling equilibrium with z
exists when p i (M jz i ) = p M if the platform is more extreme than z M i . A semi-separating equilibrium with z i exists when
if the platform is more extreme than z i .
Di¤erences from Past Papers
Assumptions
As I indicated in the introduction, there are two important di¤erences between my study and those of Banks (1990) and Callander and Wilkie (2007) : (1) candidates choose a policy to implement strategically and (2) they care about policy when they lose.
In a semi-separating equilibrium, an extreme type reveals his type by approaching the median policy with some probability since he can obtain a higher probability of winning.
However, if candidates implement their own ideal policies automatically, voters only believe that an extreme type will implement his ideal policy, so a separating extreme type cannot increase his probability of winning by revealing his type. That is, a strategic choice of an implemented policy provides a way to win for an extreme type.
Suppose that a candidate does not care about policy when he loses. From (1), the expected utility of candidates is
Obviously, candidates will announce their ideal policy as platforms (and his/her expected utility is zero) because if not, they will incur disutility from the policy and a cost of betrayal, and the expected utility becomes negative. Thus, bene…ts from holding o¢ ce should be introduced to induce candidates to approach the median policy. However, even with bene…ts 21 For example, suppose that o¤-path beliefs are from holding o¢ ce, a semi-separating equilibrium does not exist when candidates do not care about policy after losing. An extreme type has a stronger incentive to prevent the opponent from winning in my model, but to a lesser extent when they do not care about an opponent's policy. Thus, caring about policy after losing provides an extreme type with an incentive to win.
Universal Divinity
Banks (1990), Callander and Wilkie (2007) , and Huang (2010) employ universal divinity, as introduced by Banks and Sobel (1987) . If universal divinity is applied to my model, in short, as Lemma 2 shows, an extreme type always has a greater incentive to announce a more moderate platform than does a moderate type. This means that a moderate type always has a stronger incentive to announce a more extreme platform than does an extreme type. Suppose a pooling equilibrium at z M i . With universal divinity, if a platform is more moderate than z
With these o¤-path beliefs, both have an incentive to deviate to a more extreme platform than z M i , be thought a moderate type by voters, and win. For the same reasons, a semi-separating equilibrium does not exist, and only a separating equilibrium exists in which an extreme type wins against a moderate type, which is discussed in Section 3.4.2. However, such a separating equilibrium seems peculiar, as I discussed. Moreover, in this separating equilibrium, an extreme type always wins against a moderate type, so my main result does not change.
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Conclusion
This study examined how an extreme candidate wins against a moderate candidate to provide one reason to have political polarization, based on the model of partially binding platforms with asymmetric information. There are two main equilibria, namely semi-separating and pooling, and voters cannot determine a candidate's political preferences in any equilibrium. In a pooling equilibrium, an extreme candidate imitates a moderate candidate by announcing the same platform as the moderate candidate. In a semi-separating equilibrium, an extreme candidate imitates a moderate candidate with some probability, and with the remaining probability reveals his own preferences by approaching the median policy. An extreme candidate who reveals his preference type will defeat an unknown candidate who may be moderate or extreme, even though this extreme candidate will implement a more extreme policy than the moderate candidate. This is because voters wish to avoid electing an extreme type who imitates a moderate candidate and will implement the most extreme policy. As a result, an extreme candidate has a higher expected probability of winning than a moderate candidate. The important reason for this result is that an extreme candidate has a stronger incentive to prevent an opponent from winning because his ideal policy is further from the opponent's policy than is the ideal policy of a moderate candidate.
More work is needed to investigate these …ndings. In particular, this study assumes that candidates are symmetric, and that there are only two types of candidates. However, in reality, these characteristics may di¤er. First, voters may have asymmetric degrees of uncertainty about candidates. For example, in an election between an incumbent and a challenger, an incumbent's type is usually less uncertain. Second, the cost of betrayal should be derived endogenously. For example, if the candidate is more senior and has an incumbent advantage, he or she may not care about the next election. In this case, such a candidate will not care as much about the cost of betrayal. Third, candidates'ideal positions may not be symmetric, and one candidate's ideal policy may be closer to the median policy than the ideal policies of other candidates.
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To show the basic implication of the …ndings, namely the advantage of an extreme type, this study employs the simplest settings. As shown, partially binding platforms induce di¤erent predictions and, therefore, applications of a model of partially binding platforms are interesting subjects for future research. For such applications, some assumptions need to be relaxed or added, but these depend on the nature of the application. As a result, this study concentrates only on the simplest case.
A Proofs
A.1 Proposition 1
First, a candidate has no incentive to deviate to a more extreme platform than z 
A.2 Lemma 2
Consider a case of R, without loss of generality. Let
) denote the situation where the utility when type t R wins is the same as the expected utility for type t R when L wins, given z L . This means that
where z t R ( t R ) represents the platform in which the candidate implements t R . First, I prove the second statement.
(ii) Di¤erentiate both sides of (10) with respect to x t R , given the opponent's strategies (
From Lemma 1,
Substitute these values into (11), which then becomes
If (12) is positive, an extreme type will implement a more extreme policy than will a moderate type. In the same way as @z
so the denominator of (12) is positive. To prove that (12) is positive, it is su¢ cient to show that the numerator of (12) is positive. In other words,
Note that, from (10) and Lemma 1,
Since I assume that c
The right-hand side of (13) is greater than the right-hand side of (14). Therefore, if the left-hand side of (13) is less than the left-hand side of (14), (13) holds. This means 
. This value is negative because I assume that v 00 (d)=v 0 (d) strictly decreases as d increases. As a result, the left-hand side of (13) is less than the left-hand side of (14), so (13) holds, and (12) is positive.
(i) The …rst statement is true because 
As a result, (16) holds, so a value of M 2 (0; 1) under which an extreme type is indi¤erent between z i and z i exists.
A.4.2 The Other Bound of Support for F (:)
The distribution function, F (:), satis…es the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Suppose that a continuous semi-separating equilibrium exists. In such an equilibrium, F (:) is continuous with connected support.
Proof: If F (:) has a discontinuity at some policy, say z
, there is a strictly positive probability that an opponent also chooses z 0 j (the probability density function is f (z 0 j ) > 0). If this candidate approaches the median policy by an in…nitesimal degree, it increases the probability of winning by f (z 0 j )=2 > 0. On the other hand, because this approach is minor, the expected utility changes by slightly less than
, and is positive (or negative). This implies that if F (:) has a discontinuity, it cannot be part of a continuous semi-separating equilibrium.
Assume that F (:) is constant in some region, [z 1 ; z 2 ], in the convex hull of the support. If a candidate chooses z 1 , he has an incentive to deviate to z 2 because the probability of winning does not change. However, the implemented policy will approach the candidate's own ideal policy, so the expected utility increases. Thus, the support of F (:) must be connected.
, and the probability of winning is one. If (9) does not hold,
Therefore, a continuous semi-separating equilibrium exists. If (9) holds, the extreme bound and the moderate bound are equivalent (a two-policy semi-separating equilibrium). Suppose that (9) does not hold.
In equilibrium, V E i (z i ) and V E i ( z i ) should be the same, so z i and F (:) should satisfy the following equation. Further, suppose R, without loss of generality, then
I assume that the two candidates' positions are symmetric, so when z R decreases, z L in-
A.4.3 De…ne F (:)
Suppose R, without loss of generality. Let X(z
, the expected utility should be the same as . 25 This means that
The distribution function, F X (:), is de…ned by the above equation for any platform in support 
This equation holds if and only if
z 0 R = z R and X(z 0 L ) = 0, such that = V E R (z R ). Then, X(z 0 L ) = 0 if and only if z 0 L = z L . Therefore, when z 0 R and z 0 L become z R and z L , respectively, F (z 0 R ) becomes zero. When F (z 0 R ) = 1, it is = (p M + M (1 p M ))( v(x E R E R (z 0 R )) c( E R (z 0 R ) z 0M R )(1 25 When extreme type R chooses z 0 R 2 [z R ; z R ], the expected utility is (1 p M )F (z 0 R ) v(x E R E R (z 0 R )) c( E R (z 0 R ) z 0 R ) (1 M )(1 p M ) R z L z 0 L v(x E R E L (z L ))dF (z L ): p M )X(z 0 L )
. This equation holds if and only if
z 0 R = z R and X(z 0 L ) = R z L z L v(x E R E L (z L ))dF (z L ), such that = V E R ( z R ). This means that when z 0 R and z 0 L become z R and z L , respectively, F (z 0 R ) becomes one. When z 0 L satis…es jx m z 0 L j = jx m z 0 R j, that
A.4.5 A Moderate Type does not Deviate
Suppose R, without loss of generality. As a moderate type is indi¤erent between winning and losing at z R , she is indi¤erent on whether to deviate to a platform that is more extreme than z R or between z R and z R . The second possibility involves deviating to any platform in
For an extreme type, the candidate is indi¤erent between z R and z 0 R . This means that
A moderate type has no incentive to deviate to z
I disregard (1 M )(1 p M ) and di¤erentiate the right-hand side of the above equations
. This is positive because the opponent's implemented policy is further from the ideal policy than z 0 R , so the right-hand side of (20) is greater than the right-hand side of (21). From (15), at z 0 R = z R , the left-hand side of (20) is zero. From (7), the left-hand side of (21) 
This implies that if z 0 R becomes smaller, then the left-hand sides of both equations increase. The next problem is the degree of increase. Di¤erentiating
I di¤erentiate (15) with respect to x t R , then
Thus, the value of (22) is negative. This implies that if x t R is more extreme, the increase of the left-hand side is lower when z 0 R becomes smaller. At z 0 R = z R , the left-hand side of (20) is lower than the right-hand side of (21). If z 0 R becomes more moderate, both left-hand sides increase, but an increase in (21) is greater than an increase in (20). As a result, for all z 0 R , the left-hand side of (20) is lower than the right-hand side of (21), and (21) is satis…ed.
Finally, since a moderate type has no incentive to deviate to z R , she does not deviate to any policy that is more moderate than z R .
A.5 Proposition 3
In such a separating equilibrium, the utility of candidate i of type t when he/she wins
. Then, the utility of candidate i of type t when a same-type opponent (type t) wins is v(j [ Figure A-1 here] Then, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 4
The extreme type's cut-o¤ platform is more moderate than that of the moderate
, but the extreme type's implemented policy given the cut-o¤ platform is more extreme than that of the moderate type,
Proof: To prove this, I di¤erentiate (10) with respect to
2x m because the platforms are symmetric. Di¤erentiating both sides of (10) with respect to x t R x t L is the same as di¤erentiating both sides of the rewritten equation with respect to x t R . Then,
For the same reason given in Lemma 2, this is positive. Note that @z
The second term of the right-hand side is negative. The …rst term is also negative since The …nal case is that moderate type L defeats extreme type R (
) when moderate type L announces a platform that is the same as, or closer to her own ideal policy thanẑ
, extreme type L can win against extreme type R with certainty, and so gain a higher probability of winning. With this deviation, an extreme type can implement a policy closer to his ideal policy, so he will deviate.
B Examples
The important equilibrium is a semi-separating equilibrium. Thus, I discuss the national elections in Turkey, Japan, and the UK as examples of this equilibrium. However, I show here that these examples have at least the following four important characteristics of a semi-separating equilibrium: (1) one party's platform is more moderate than the other party's platform; (2) voters guess that such a party is an extreme type; (3) voters are uncertain whether the opposition(s) is an extreme type; and (4) the party that announces the more moderate platform wins the election. Therefore, this case has the four characteristics of a semi-separating equilibrium: (1) the AKP compromised greatly by promising politico-religious separation; (2) people recognized the AKP as an extreme party that still supported Political Islam; (3) the type of the opponents became uncertain for voters after the threat of a coup; and (4) the AKP won.
B.1 Turkey
B.2 Japan
In Japan, there are two main parties, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which supports increasing government spending on, for example, public works to sustain rural areas, and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which supports economic reforms and reducing government debt. In 2001, the LDP chose Junichiro Koizumi as their leader. Koizumi promised to implement economic reforms such as reducing government works and debt, and moreover, promised to "destroy"the (traditional) LDP. After the "great depression"during the 1990s, many Japanese supported implementing economic reforms rather than traditional economic policies, so the LDP's position should be further from the median policy than the DPJ after 1990s. Indeed, voters were afraid that the LDP would not implement the economic reforms (Mulgan, 2002) . The opposition, the DPJ, had no experience in government, so voters remained uncertain about the party. Finally, the LDP of Koizumi won the elections in 2001, 2003, and 2005. This case also satis…es the four characteristics of a semi-separating equilibrium: (1) the LDP compromised greatly by promising to destroy the traditional LDP; (2) people still believed that the LDP was too conservative; (3) the DPJ's type was uncertain for voters, as it had no experience in government; and (4) the LDP won.
B.3 The UK
In the UK, there are two major parties, the Conservative Party and the Labour Party. On the other hand, voters were uncertain about the Conservative Party preferences because of in…ghting between factions. As a result, the Labour Party won the 1997 election (Clarke, 2004 ).
This case matches the four characteristics of a semi-separating equilibrium, as follows:
(1) the Labour Party compromised greatly by promising the Third Way; (2) people believed that the Labour Party supported socialist policies, since many members still supported these policies; (3) the type of the Conservative Party was uncertain for voters because of intra-party con ‡ict; and (4) the Labour Party won.
C Position of the Platforms and a Probabilistic Model
In any equilibrium, implemented policies never encroach on the opponent's side of the policy space (i.e., t L (z L ) x m t R (z R )), otherwise candidates can always …nd a better choice in which an implemented policy remains on their own side.
On the other hand, platforms may encroach on the opponent's side (i.e., z t R < x m < z t L ). This study allows for this situation and does not restrict candidates to announcing platforms only within their own halves of the policy space. However, this problem is not a critical one.
My model assumes that candidates know every decision-relevant fact about the median voter. If candidates are uncertain about voter preferences-that is, a probabilistic model is considered-in many cases, the above situation does not hold. That candidates have a greater divergence of policies in a probabilistic model is well known (see Calvert (1985) ).
That is, platforms do not encroach on the opponent's platform in a probabilistic model when the degree of uncertainty is su¢ ciently high. However, the purpose of this study is to analyze the e¤ect of partially binding platforms on policy, so for the sake of simplicity, I do not consider such probabilistic models here. 28 Figure 1: Ideal Policy, Platform and Implemented Policy Each candidate has an ideal policy, and announces a campaign platform before an election. Given the ideal policy and the platform, the winning candidate decides the implemented policy which will be between the ideal policy and the platform. 
